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Corrective Justice and Copyright
Infringement
PatrickR. Goold*
ABSTRACT

This Article demonstrates that one important goal of copyright
infringement cases is the achievement of corrective justice. The
importance of correctivejustice to the copyright system is demonstrated
by the law's continual reliance on a bilateral litigation model. Sadly,
because scholars and lawmakers often conceive of copyright in solely
economic terms, correctivejustice is often overlooked and demonstrable
unfairness occurs as a result. This Article discusses three areas of
contemporary copyright law where the failure to consider corrective
justice leads to unfair outcomes: the provision of statutory damages in
civil copyright claims, the availability of attorney's fees, and mass
copyright settlements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN TORT LAW ...................................
A. The Economic Theory of Tort Law ................................
B. Problems with the Economic Theory of Tort Law ..........
1. Tort's Bilateral Structure ...................................
2. A ctual Causation ................................................
C. Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law ..........................
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ......
A. The Economic Theory of Copyright ...............................
B. Problems with the Economic Analysis of Copyright
Infringement ................................................................

258

258
261
262
265
266

270
271
272

The author would like to thank the following people for their invaluable assistance
on this project: Pamela Samuelson, Talha Syed, Robert Merges, Peter Menell, Molly Van
Houweling, Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer Urban, Robert Cooter, Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Abraham Drassinower, Steven Sugarman, Mark Gergen, Oren Bracha, all of the participants at
the Seton Hall Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Conference, all of the participants at
the Cardozo Law School Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the editors of the
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law. Any and all mistakes are due to the
author. Please send feedback and comments to patrickgoold@law.berkeley.edu.

252

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:2:251

1. Copyright's Bilateral Structure .......................... 272
2. Copying and Independent Re-creation ............... 275
C. Corrective Justice Theory and Copyright Infringement. 279
1. Copyright Rem edies ...........................................
282
III.

IV .

CORRECTIVE INJUSTICES IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT .... 284

A. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement ................
1. Punitive Civil Damages Are Unjust ...................
2. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement as
D ignitary H arm .................................................
B . A ttorney's Fees ..............................................................
C. Mass Copyright Infringement Settlements ....................

285
285

CON CLU SION .....................................................................

294

287
289
290

Copyright law provides authors with an exclusive right to copy
their literary and artistic works.1 If someone copies the work without
permission, the author can sue that person for a remedy. 2 Why is this
the case? Why can the author sue the infringer for compensation?
Unlike the dominant theories of copyright, this Article answers these
questions by appealing to corrective justice theory. Although it is
often forgotten, one central purpose of copyright infringement cases is
the correction of past injustices. Sadly, as scholars, legislatures, and
judges typically conceive of copyright solely in economic terms, this
important function is often overlooked, and demonstrable unfairness
occurs as a result. 3
While the initial grant of copyright may be proprietary in
nature, 4 the act of infringing copyright is a tort.5 It follows that

1.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
2.
See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
3.
See infra Part III.
4.
The question of whether intellectual property rights are proprietary or personal in
nature is one of the longest standing issues of copyright law. For modern views on this issue, see,
for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 108 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundationsof
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?];
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997);
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116
YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885
(2008). Other scholars have demonstrated concern for such discussion of intellectual property
rights as analogous to real property. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV.
1119 (1983); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003);
Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 396-97 (1989) (expressing
desire that "the first amendment's protection of free speech interests will serve as some check on
the reach of the information as property doctrine.").
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understanding the function of copyright infringement cases requires
consideration of the purposes of tort law generally, 6 of which there are
two: the promotion of economic welfare and the achievement of
corrective justice.7 The former theory states that tort law is a tool for
maximizing welfare.8 As accidents are costly for society, tort law
exists to deter people from causing them in inefficient amounts. 9
5.
See, e.g., Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Fundamentally,
proving the basic tort of infringement simply requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
had an actual opportunity to copy the original... and that the two works share enough unique
features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another's work."); Brayton Purcell LLP v.
Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Here, the underlying action is
copyright infringement, which is often characterized as a tort." (citing Columbia Pictures
Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998))); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.
Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) ("Rights secured by copyright are property within the
meaning of the law of copyright, and whoever invades that property beyond the privilege
conceded to subsequent authors commits a tort .... ). Much like the case when someone invades
the property right of another, they cause the tort of trespass, the infringement of copyright is a
tort. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to
Chattels and the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 135, 137-43
(2006) (analyzing the tort of trespass to chattels with a focus on the common law actual damage
requirement).
6.
In recent years, a number of scholars have started to examine how intellectual
property overlaps with tort. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2011); Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law's Mirror Image:
"Harms," "Benefits," and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003)
[hereinafter Gordon, MirrorImage]; Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution,
and Intellectual Property, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Of Harms and
Benefits]; Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation
and Other Common Law Theories of Protectionfor Intellectual Property, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH
401 (1998); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to Intellectual Property, 88
TRADEMARK REP. 101, 101 (1998); see also Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace:
Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for
Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729 (1996); Peter S.
Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort
Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007); Peter S. Menell, The
Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for Statutory
Interpretation(forthcoming 2013); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 941, 994-96 (2007); Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry
and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962); A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory
Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1989).
See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
7.
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997).
See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 322-65 (5th ed.
8.
2008); see also John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound
Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1980). Nevertheless, empirical studies
suggest scholarly opinion is still divided on the efficiency of tort doctrines. See John C.
Moorhouse, Andrew P. Morriss & Robert Whaples, Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of
Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 694 (1998). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-212 (6th ed. 2003).
9.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 346.
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this is the only function of the law.
Standing alone, the economic goal does not justify a central feature of
tort law, i.e. the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. 10 It
does not explain why the defendant should pay this particular plaintiff
a remedy.1" All that is needed to deter people from causing accidents
is to make the defendant pay a penalty to someone when his conduct
results in injury.1 2 It does not matter greatly to the defendant who
that someone is.13 The deterrence rationale will equally be fulfilled if
the defendant's inefficient actions result in him paying a criminal fine,
14
civil damages, or a donation to a third party (e.g., a charity).
Tort scholars typically explain this feature by appealing to
tort's second function: corrective justice. 15 The relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant exists because those who cause another
harm have a duty to correct that harm.1 6 The desirability of correction
itself flows from the importance of equality. 17 People are equally
entitled to the resources they hold (including their property and legal
rights).18 When people interact with one another, they ought to
respect the equality of the other individual.1 9 Tortious conduct is
wrongful because it creates an inequality. 20 The action allows the
tortfeasor to gain something at the expense of the victim. 2 1 For
example, if a tortfeasor steals a car, he gains what the victim loses: a

10.
See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13-24 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 46-48 (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB,

IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]; Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1248-53
(1988) [hereinafter Coleman, Structure].
11.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18; WEINRIB, IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 47.
12.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18.
13.
See id.
14.
See id.
15.
See id. at 1-63; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361-85 (2002) [hereinafter
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 9-37 (2012)
[hereinafter WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE]; WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at

56-83. Other notable corrective justice theories in tort can be found elsewhere. See John Borgo,
Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77
IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Frederick L. Sharp, Aristotle, Justice and Enterprise Liability in the
Law of Torts, 34 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 84 (1976); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, not
CorrectiveJustice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003).
16.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 15.
17.

See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 58-66.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See

id. at 61-66.
id.
id.
id.
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car. The law exists to correct the resulting inequality. 22 By making
the defendant compensate the plaintiff, the law removes the wrongful
gain and the wrongful loss arising from the interaction. 23 The remedy
puts the parties back into their original positions and restores the
Tort therefore is not merely about
antecedent equilibrium. 24
25
efficiency; it is also about equity.
Copyright scholars and lawmakers typically say that copyright
is also an economic tool for welfare maximization. 26 Society enjoys
literary and artistic works, but these works may be underproduced
28
due to a market failure. 27 Creating works entails high fixed costs.
29
Authors must invest extensive resources, such as time and money, to
produce the work's first copy. 30 Many authors would not undertake
31
such an investment if they could not later recover those costs.
Copyright solves this problem by providing the author with market
exclusivity, allowing him to sell subsequent copies of the work at a
price above marginal cost. 32 This enables him to recover his fixed cost

See id.
22.
23.
See id.
See id.
24.
For perspectives on both efficiency and equity considerations in tort, see, for
25.
example, Robert D. Cooter, Liberty, Efficiency, and Law, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1987);
Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice]; Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997); Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Deterrenceand Corrective Justice].
See, e.g., RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES?
26.
11-15 (2000); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 5-6 (1991); Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics
of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397 (2012);
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-14 (1982) [hereinafter
Gordon, Fair Use]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325-33 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law]; Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167
(1934). But see Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright,
56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966) (noting criticism of copyright as an economic tool for welfare
maximization).
27.
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at
326-33.
28.
See id.
29.
The term "author" throughout the article is used to include the first creator of the
work as well people to whom the copyright is subsequently transferred.
See id.
30.
31.
See id.
32.
See id.
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and gives him an incentive to produce the work in the first place. 33
When infringement threatens his ability to recover the creative
investment, the author can sue the infringer as a second-best way to
recover his lost fixed costs.
It is often unrecognized, however, that the economic goal is
unlikely to be the only function of copyright infringement suits. Once
again, the economic goal does not justify the relationship between the
two relevant parties. The economic theory does not state why the
author must receive compensation from this particular infringer. If
the only goal of copyright is to incentivize the author to create works,
all the author needs is a reward for creation. It does not matter
particularly where that reward comes from. 34 The government could
subsidize creation, or prizes could be awarded for the publication of
popular works. 35 In both cases, the author would have an incentive to

See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The
33.
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."' (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("It is evident that the monopoly
granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new
material of potential historical value."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that copyright is "intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ('The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the
public of the products of his creative genius."); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996) ("[lIt is incentive language that pervades the
Supreme Court's copyright jurisprudence.").
34.
This is demonstrated by the current discussion on alternative compensation
mechanisms for authors where some academics favor abandoning the current copyright system
in favor of an alternative system, which does not require authors to sue infringers. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property:
When is it the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Jaffe et al.
eds., 2002); Ville Oksanen & Mikko Vilimaki, Copyright Levies as an Alternative Compensation
Method for Recording Artists and Technological Development, 2 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 25 (2005) (discussing subsidizing creation through revenue gathered by levies on copying
equipment).
35.
See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281-91 (1970) (discussing
the potential for government grants and prizes to accomplish the goals of copyright); Ruth
Towse, Copyright and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 567 (2006).
This discussion also is found in patent law. See, e.g., William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, A Prize
System as a PartialSolution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World (Harvard Law School,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Paper
No.
5,
2009),
available at
Discussion
FisherPrizesl2.pdf.
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create. 36 Even if copyright is preferable to these methods, there is no
particular reason why it is the infringer who should compensate the
author. The author's incentives will be equally secure if, upon
infringement, he is compensated by a government-compensation
scheme, an insurance policy, or a random third party. All that is
required is compensation from someone.
This Article argues that the relationship between author and
infringer stems from copyright's second function: the correction of past
injustices. 37 The law initially recognizes the author's copyright for a
39
number of reasons: some economic, 38 some based on natural rights,
and others based on visions of a good society.4 0 When a user interacts
with the work, that user ought to respect the legitimate rights of the
author. In turn, the author must equally respect the rights of the
user, such as fair use. 41 When the user infringes copyright, he creates

36.
Some authors go as far as to say the existence of modern peer-to-peer technology
makes copying so easy that we must partially abandon the traditional copyright protection model
in favor of greater reliance on compulsory licensing. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Impose a
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2003); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Futureof Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005).
37.
Other authors have discussed the issue of corrective justice in copyright, but no one
has made a basic case for the existence of a corrective justice norm in copyright infringement.
See generally, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE
L.J. 203 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Normativity]; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory
Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012)
[hereinafter Balganesh, Obligatory Structure]; Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective
Justice in Trade Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (taking the discussion of corrective justice in
copyright and applying it to trade secret law); Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Is Not About
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2012); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter
Gordon, On Owning]; Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3
LEGAL THEORY 347 (1997) (using corrective justice as a lens through which to view fair use).
38.
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at
326.
39.
See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13-33 (1996);
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32-67 (2011) [hereinafter MERGES,
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual

Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 4, at
20-27; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of
Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1 (1994); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the Author', 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984);

Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
517 (1990).

40.

See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE

LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 189-99 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed., 2001); Neil W.

Netanel, Copyright and a DemocraticCivil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
41.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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an inequality. The author loses something and the infringer gains
something. The author loses the work's market value, while the
copyist receives a copy of the work without obtaining the author's
consent and without paying the relevant license fee. The law operates
to correct the wrongful losses and gains made. By making the
infringer compensate the author, the law annuls the inequality and
puts the parties back into the positions they occupied prior to the
infringement.
While copyright scholars have recently expressed the need to
42
supplement society's views of copyright with noneconomic theories,
the academy has overlooked the importance of corrective justice. This
is a serious failing. While this Article does not claim corrective justice
is the sole purpose of copyright infringement cases, it does assert that
corrective justice is important and too easily forgotten. Maximizing
welfare may well be the primary purpose of the law, but it is pursued
subject to the constraints of fairness and individual responsibility
imposed by copyright infringement's secondary goal: corrective justice.
When scholars and lawmakers forget this function of copyright, the
law can become unfair. This Article will highlight three example
areas in which the law is currently unjust from a corrective justice
perspective: the availability of statutory damages for willful
infringement
in
civil
cases,
attorney's
fees,
and
mass
copyright-infringement suit settlements.
Part I summarizes the literature on tort's purposes. While the
economic theory struggles to explain the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant, corrective justice theory explains this
relationship intuitively. Part II discusses the purposes of copyright
infringement law. Again, the economic theory does not satisfactorily
explain the relationship between the author and infringer, but the
corrective justice theory illuminates this aspect of the law. Part III
considers three areas where the law currently fails to achieve
corrective justice and demonstrates how the law ought to be reformed.

I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN TORT LAW
A. The Economic Theory of Tort Law
Accidents negatively affect welfare. To reduce the number of
accidents, tort law exists to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct. 43
42.
See, e.g., ROBERTA R. KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010); MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note
39; MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE (2012).

43.
See Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits, supranote 6, at 544 ("[Tort] law imposes duties
to avoid unreasonable behavior that could cause strangers harm .... ").
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By making a tortfeasor responsible for the harm he causes, the law
encourages people to internalize the costs of their actions, thus
providing private incentives to prevent the accident. 44 This process is
most clearly observed in strict-liability cases, such as liability for
ultra-hazardous blasting. 45 A person who deliberately causes an
explosion will be liable for any harm that results. 46 If the blasting
harms a neighboring house, for example, the blaster must compensate
the owner for the harm. 47 The blaster therefore takes these potential
costs into account and will try to reduce the risk to nearby people and
property.
This does not mean that tort law attempts to prevent all harm
in all instances. Often the cost of prevention will outweigh the costs of
the accident itself. 48 A common example is that of driving cars.
Automobiles cause many accidents that could be eliminated by
making motoring illegal. Naturally, such laws are not passed because
the costs of prohibiting automobiles would outweigh the benefits of
preventing accidents. In these cases, the law tries to minimize the
aggregate costs of two variables: the cost of the accident and the costs
49
of prevention.
Under a strict-liability standard, the defendant assumes
responsibility for the costs of the accident and the costs of prevention
and will accordingly act in a way to minimize that cost. 50 But more
commonly, this tradeoff exists in the domain of negligence law. 51 In
such cases, the defendant shall only be liable for actions that are
"unreasonable" (i.e., when the costs of the accident are greater than
the costs of preventing the accident). 52 For example, imagine a patron
44.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 325 (the economic essence of tort is that it
internalizes externalities, thus providing the socially optimal incentives for private actors).
45.
See id. at 338-41.
46.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. For law on ultra-hazardous activity,
see, for example, Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121
S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Robert W. James, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous
Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1949); Andrew 0.
Smith, The Manufacture and Distributionof Handguns as an Abnormally DangerousActivity, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (1987).
47.
See Smith, supra note 46, at 382.
48.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 336-38.
49.
See id. at 336.
50.
See id. at 340.
51.
See id. at 342-45.
52.
See In re City of New York v. Agni, 522 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[OJur analysis
under the Hand formula leads us to compare a relatively small burden of adequate precautions
with a very small risk of great harm. . . . Judge Hand's test is really more of an analytic
framework than an actual formula into which we could plug rough numerical estimates of
burdens and injuries ....");Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 369 F.3d 978, 997 (6th Cir. 2004)
("When a jury makes a negligence determination, its determination can be likened, using the
famous 'Hand formula,' to a balancing of the burden on the defendant in adting more carefully
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who sues a caf6 owner when that patron is injured after slipping on an
uneven floor. If the harm caused totals $100, and the cost of repairing
the floor is $50, then the defendant will be liable for taking
unreasonable risk. On the other hand, if the cost of mending the floor
is $150, then the defendant's actions were not negligent. 53 In such
cases, the tortfeasor is incentivized to prevent only inefficient
54
accidents.
Yet, a question still remains. The law gives incentives for
actors to take efficient levels of care, but who exactly should be given
the incentive? Often more than one person could avoid the accident.
In the ultra-hazardous blasting example, making the defendant liable
for the harm incentivizes him to avoid the accident. Not making the
defendant liable, however, results in the victim bearing the loss and
therefore giving the victim an incentive to avoid the accident (e.g., by
moving the property away from the blast zone). 55 Likewise, in the
negligence example, either the caf6 owner or the patron could have
taken care to avoid the accident.
To answer this question, the law relies on the concept of the
least-cost avoider. 56 This approach makes the person who can avoid
the accident at the cheapest possible cost responsible for the loss. 57 In
the strict-liability example, the neighboring property owner could
avoid the harm by moving his house. But moving the property would
be very costly. It is better to make the defendant liable in these cases
because he can more cheaply avoid the accident (e.g., by limiting the
58
effects of the explosion).

against the probability of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm if the defendant does not so
act." (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)), rev'd on other
grounds, 529 U.S. 344 (2000)); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (where Judge Learned Hand offered the infamous formula for negligence: "if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less [than] PL."); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-36 (1972).
53.

See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW

46-82 (2d ed. 1997).
54.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 322-64.
55.
See id.
56.
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the
Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1992).
57.
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 56 at 1060.
58.
See id.; Gilles, supra note 56, at 1306.
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B. Problems with the Economic Theory of Tort Law
Tort law serves this economic function.5 9 Nevertheless, as a
positive theory of law, it is hardly unassailable. Scholars point out
many problems with the theory, such as: (1) often people are not the
rational welfare maximizers that economics supposes; 60 (2) the law
does not actually deter accidents; 61 and (3) the economic theory does
62
not take seriously the views of those who actually practice the law.
As a result, many of the economic theorists do not believe that the law
is solely dictated by efficiency concerns, but displays other important
functions .63
It is unnecessary to repeat all of the problems with the
economic theory here. Yet one of those problems will be salient in
demonstrating how corrective justice works. That is, the economic
theory struggles to explain the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant. This can be broken down into two further arguments: the
theory's difficulty in explaining the bilateral structure of tort law and
the theory's failure to account for the role of causation.

59.
60.

See sources cited supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral

Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13-59 (Cass R. Sunstein

ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-10 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000); see also JUDGMENT AND UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahnemen et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter UNCERTAINTY]; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488
(1998). These ideas have also had some impact on court decisions. See, e.g., Schwade v. Total
Plastics, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2011) ("[O]ne possible attraction of
hindsight bias is that it may be quite flattering to represent oneself as having known all along
what was going to happen." (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 429 (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, eds., 1982)));
Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 1354711, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2002) ("Of course, we do know that not everyone behaves in a way that economists deem
'rational."'). For the application of behavioral law and economics to copyright, see, for example,
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 33
(2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2010); Christopher Buccafusco et al., What's a Name
Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 106).
61.
See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of
Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 152-53 (1994); see also Christopher J. Bruce,
The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical
Literature, 6 L. & POL'Y 67 (1984).

62.
See William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of
Tort Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605, 610-12 (2007).
63.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27 (7th ed. 2007) ("But there

is more to notions of justice than a concern with efficiency.").
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1. Tort's Bilateral Structure
Tort litigation is bilateral, or two-sided. A plaintiff sues a
defendant, asserting the defendant caused him wrongful harm and
therefore owes the plaintiff compensation. 64 This bilateral structure is
somewhat puzzling in the economic interpretation of tort.65 The
deterrence goal could be achieved through various mechanisms, none
of which require treating the defendant and plaintiff together in this
fashion. 66 This point can be illustrated through a number of
67
questions.
To begin, why is it necessary for the defendant to compensate
this particular plaintiff? 68
The economic theory states that
threatening the defendant with such liability will result in the
defendant taking efficient care to avoid the accident. 69 However, the
need to deter accidents does not provide a reason why the defendant
ought to pay this particular plaintiff. If the only goal is to deter the
defendant from causing the accident, all that is needed is to make him
pay someone a penalty for causing the accident. The defendant will be
equally incentivized towards efficient behavior if non-efficient
behavior results in him paying a fine to the government or a random
64.
We can illustrate this bilateral structure by contrasting a typical tort scenario with a
non-correlative method of resolving the issue. See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 12
(1997). When an accident occurs, both tort and insurance schemes provide compensation, but the
relevant parties implicated by the operations are different. See id. In tort cases, the plaintiff will
claim that the defendant has committed a wrong and therefore caused injury. See id. If the court
agrees, liability will be imposed on the defendant who must then pay the plaintiff a remedy. See
id. Alternatively, in insurance claims, the victim will receive recompense not from a particular
wrongdoer but from a pool of resources. See id. The compensation does not come from one person
but from the group of people that contribute towards the insurance scheme. See id. The
insurance claim does not focus on a bilateral relationship but on a multilateral relationship
between everyone associated with the resource pool. See id.
The bilateral relationship between the two parties may also be substantive as well
as structural, and a number of texts have demonstrated that the substantive content of legal
rights must impose correlative duties on the other party in the interaction. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 30-32 (1913); David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 NOS 45, 47 (1970);
Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 L. & PHIL 537, 539 (2009); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (holding that the plaintiff cannot recover merely when someone
breaches a duty resulting in harm, but can only recover when harm results from the breach of a
duty owed to the plaintiff and correlated with his right).
65.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 46-48; Coleman, Structure,
supra note 10, at 1250-53.
66.
See, e.g., Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its
Alternatives: A Review of the EmpiricalEvidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992).
67.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13-24; see also WILLIAM
Lucy, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 33-43 (2007) [hereinafter LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF
PRIVATE LAW].
68.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18.
69.
See supra Part I.A.
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third party (such as a charity).70 It is paying the fine that provides the
necessary incentives, not where that fine ultimately ends up. 71 As
Judge Richard Posner explains: "that the damages are paid to the
72
plaintiff is, from the economic standpoint, a detail."
Or the same problem can be approached from the opposite
direction. Why is it necessary that the plaintiff sue this particular
defendant? 73 Economists would answer that this defendant is the
least-cost avoider and therefore the person best placed to avoid the
accident in the most efficient way. 74 By publicly holding this least-cost
avoider liable, other similarly situated least-cost avoiders in the future
will be given an ultimatum: act efficiently or bear the costs of
liability. 75 But there is often little reason to think the defendant is the
least-cost avoider. It may be true that he is the least-cost avoider-or,
more precisely, a lesser-cost avoider-when compared to the plaintiff,
but that says little about third parties. It is quite possible that a third
party is in fact the best positioned to avoid the accident. 76 To return
briefly to the automobile example, many car accidents are the result of
excessive speed. It could be the case that the car manufacturer is best
placed to avoid these harms, simply by restricting the speed at which
its car can drive. Yet, the victim in such a case does not sue the
manufacturer, nor is there any requirement on the victim to show that
77
the defendant he does eventually sue is the real least-cost avoider.
This is the case even when the cost of identifying the real least-cost
78
avoider is comparatively low.
One can also ask, why is it necessary for the defendant to pay
anyone at all monetary damages? The costs incurred in the tort are
sunk; the car in the road traffic accident is already dented, and the
property near a blast site is already demolished. 79 No matter what the
court does, that will not change. It does not matter if the court makes
the defendant responsible for these costs or leaves them with the
plaintiff. On the other hand, redistributing the costs from the plaintiff
to the defendant creates further expenditure because litigation
requires time and resources. The economic theory responds that

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
supra note
77.
78.
79.

See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18.
See id.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed. 1977).
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supranote 10, at 17-18.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18; Coleman, Structure,
10, at 1241-42.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supranote 10, at 18-19.
See id. at 19-20; Coleman, Structure, supranote 10, at 1241-42.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16.
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holding the defendant liable in this case will incentivize defendants in
the future into taking efficient care.8 0 But this does not justify
redistributing the costs in any particular case.8 1 If lawmakers want to
change the incentive structure for future actors, they can simply make
a public announcement that, in the future, a fine will punish such
conduct. The efficiency of future actors is important but it does not
make costly litigation in this case necessary when there are other
equally good ways to create incentives.
Underlying all of these related issues is one fundamental
problem: the economic theory is entirely forward looking.8 2 It seeks to
83
justify the tort case solely by the effects it will have in the future.
But the basic features of the tort case are backwards looking. The
actors involved are determined by a historical event, and they argue
over the details of something that already has occurred. It is not clear
why these backward-looking features are necessary to produce good
economic results in the future.8 4 If the economic analysis were
unquestionably correct, then defendants and plaintiffs would be
selected by their relationship to the forward-looking goal of cost
reduction. The law would define the injurer and victim in a way that
would best reduce costs tomorrow.8 5 Yet the law does not select
defendants and plaintiffs
due to their relationship to a
forward-looking goal, but instead because of their relationship to one
86
another.

80.
See id. at 18; supra Part I.A.
81.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16.
82.
See id. at 16-18.
83.
See id.
84.
There is naturally a debate within the economic community over the efficiency of the
bilateral litigation model. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1993). There have been notable arguments that this system is
not efficient. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 1097-1102 (2001); Stephen Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
555 (1985). However, even if as an empirical matter economists could prove the efficiency of the
system, non-economists would still find fault in the theory. In such a case, the problem would be
that the economic theory makes the structure contingent upon its efficiency. Presumably, if it
were not efficient, the economists would abolish it in favor of something else. However, it is not
clear whether that would happen in reality, if this structure were inefficient. It is not clear that,
upon a showing of inefficiency, the victim would automatically lose their right to receive
compensation from their injurer. See, e.g., Lucy, supra note 62, at 613-14. Non-economists would
say there is a fairness concern that would justify this practice nonetheless.
85.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16-18.
86.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 47 ("Efficiency might as easily
be served by two different funds, one that receives tort fines from inefficient actors and another
that disburses the indicated inducements to victims. Instead of linking each party to the other,
economic analysis construes the presence of both as a consequence of combining incentives that
are independently applicable to each.").
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2. Actual Causation
The economic analysis also struggles to explain substantive
doctrines that exist to link the parties together. One example is the
requirement of actual causation.8 7 A defendant will not be liable
unless her particular actions cause the harm that the plaintiff
complains about.88 This is often known as the "but-for test"; that is to
say, a defendant will not be liable unless the accident would not have
occurred but for his actions.8 9 It is the plaintiffs task to show
empirically how the defendant's actions satisfy this test.90
The economic theory struggles to explain why this is a
necessary part of the law. The law's goal in this theory is welfare
maximization.9 1 By making the least-cost avoider liable, the law gives
92
future least-cost avoiders the incentive to take efficient levels of care.
Once that is considered the goal, however, the only relevant question
for the judge in any case is which party is the least-cost avoider? If it
was the defendant, then the defendant should be responsible for the
loss; if it was the plaintiff, then the defendant should not be held
responsible. But where then is the necessity of discussing causation?
Discussion of who caused whom harm is simply a waste of time if the
judge will decide purely on the basis of who is the least-cost avoider.
Thus, the positive economic theory, as Richard Wright points out,
"merely skips over" the causation requirement.93
As a result,
proponents of the economic theory have failed to define any content to
the doctrine. Ronald Coase suggested focusing not on causation, but
on whose actions were simply more efficient. 94 Likewise Judge Guido

87.
See id. at 47-48; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987) ("[Tjhe idea of causation can largely be dispensed with in an

").
economic analysis of torts ....
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
88.
41, 42 (5th ed. 1984); OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 73 (M. Holmes, ed., 1963).

89.
(1970).
90.
91.

§§

See, e.g., D. M. A. Strachan, Variations on an Enigma, 33 MOD. L. REV. 378, 386
See id. at 390.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 46-47.

92.
See supra Part I.A.
93.
Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 438 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Actual Causation]. It
is true that today causation remains as one of the basic and most decisive features of tort cases.
See, e.g., Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-484) (certiorari granted for determining proper
standard of causation of Title VII retaliation claims), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Mitchell v.
Gonzales, 54 Cal. 3d 1041 (1991) (on the substantial factor necessity in California causation

doctrine); Cowart v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 (Ga.2010) (holding that a plaintiff is required to
provide expert evidence of causation in negligence cases involving specialized medical questions).
94.
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1960).
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Calabresi called the term "causation" a "weasel word"95 devoid of
meaning. Today's modern proponents of the economic theory also
acknowledge that the economic understanding of causation is
"admittedly far from the language and concepts in which the courts
96
analyze these cases."
This economic view is unacceptable as a positive theory of the
97
law.
Causation is one of the most prominent features of tort. It is
historically one of the basic doctrines the law hinges on, and today no
tort textbook or class could seriously omit it. Causation has been a
central feature of tort since its inception, yet the classical economic
analysis does not seek to explain or justify it.98 Instead it begs the
question; why still discuss causation at all? Are lawyers simply so
ridiculous that they will cling to such vacuous and empty concepts?
Or is the pure economic answer incorrect, and causation actually has
some meaningful place in the law?
C. Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law
Corrective justice theory views tort law as a system for
correcting the wrongful losses and wrongful gains that arise from a
tortious transaction.9 9 It states that those who cause wrongful loss
have a duty to repair the loss. 10 0 This Aristotelian theory begins from
the position that people are equally entitled to their holdings
(including their physical property as well as their legal rights). 101
When people interact with one another, certain norms gdvern their
interactions. They ought to respect the right of the other person to
their holdings as much as they respect their own rights. Torts break
that balance and cause an inequality; 10 2 one party gains something
and the other party loses something. When a thief steals a car, the
95.

GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-7

n.8 (1970) [hereinafter CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]; see also Guido Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 105 (1975)

[hereinafter Calabresi, Concerning Cause] (talking about the "alien language" of causation).
96.
William Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach,
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 134 (1983).

97.
98.

See Wright, Actual Causation, supra note 93, at 435.
See id.

99.

See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4 (Martin Ostwald, trans., 1962);

Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of CorrectiveJustice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 277 (1994).
100.

See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 15 ("[The] principle states

that individuals who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the
losses."); WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 56-83; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002) ("Corrective justice is the idea that
liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another.').
101.

WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 62.

102.

Id. at 61-66.
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thief gains something, and the victim loses something: the car. When
an attacker strikes a victim, the attacker gains the freedom to serve
his own purposes, while the victim loses freedom of action as he is
forced into a situation not of his choosing. Tort law exists to correct
the inequality.1°3 By making the defendant compensate the plaintiff,
the law rectifies the unjust exchange. 10 4 The remedy removes the
wrongful gain and the wrongful loss while returning the parties
roughly to the positions they occupied prior to the tort. The role of the
judge, as Aristotle phrased it, is to be "justice ensouled."10 5 Like the
statue of Lady Justice that stands outside the Supreme Court, the
Aristotelian judge simply balances the acts of the parties and puts the
actors back into equilibrium with one another. 10 6 This theory was the
traditional understanding of tort law prior to the rise of the economic
analysis. 107 It is still a view that many tort practitioners, as well as
108
the public generally, hold.
The corrective justice account of tort law has validity as an
explanation of the tort system because it renders intelligible
something the economic theory fails to account for: the relationship
Whereas the economic
between the plaintiff and defendant.1 0 9
understanding struggles to explain the significance of the plaintiffdefendant relationship, corrective justice makes this relationship
intuitive.1 10 Most notably, it explains the bilateral structure of

103.
See id.; COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13-24; Coleman,
Structure, supra note 10, at 1240-52.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supranote 10, at 61-66; COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF
104.
PRINCIPLE, supranote 10, at 13-24; Coleman, Structure, supranote 10, at 1240-52.
Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2269 (1996) (quoting
105.
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5-6 (1995)).
See id.
106.
107.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 58-66 (discussing the
historical progression of Aristotle's views); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private
Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2002).
108.
One strain of jurisprudence says that we cannot understand the law unless we
understand the views of those who practice it and was famously articulated by Hart, as the law's
'internal points of view"' or "internal aspect of rules." See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
56, 89 (2d ed. 1994); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 11-15 (1998). The two most wellknown corrective justice theorists, Coleman and Weinrib, both ascribe to this view and believe it
sets their account apart from the economic view. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note
15, at 6-10; WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 8-16. Coleman calls this "middlelevel theory." See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at 6-10. Weinrib calls this the
search for the "internal account" of tort law. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10,
at 8-16.
See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1815-16.
109.
110.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 56 ("Corrective justice thus
treats the wrong, and the transfer of resources that undoes it, as a single nexus of activity and
passivity where actor and victim are defined in relation to each other."); see also COLEMAN,
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13-24.
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litigation. 1 ' The plaintiff must sue this defendant because it is this
defendant who gained something from the tort.
Likewise, the
defendant must compensate this plaintiff because it is this plaintiff
who lost something in the encounter. Only the transfer of the
wrongful gain back to the victim restores equilibrium.
The
redistribution in this case will not increase the amount of welfare
because the costs of the accident are sunk, but it will equitably rectify
112
an unequal distribution of harm.
As a result, the law is naturally backward looking. If the
function of the law is to correct a wrong that has occurred in the past,
then the past will necessarily determine the aspects of litigation (e.g.,
the facts discussed and the litigating parties).
The parties are
determined historically by their connection to one another, not by
their relationship to a forward-looking, normative goal.1 13 The law
looks backwards to determine who committed a wrong, and then tries
to address that, rather than looking forwards to improve efficiency
tomorrow. 114
This also helps illuminate the doctrine of causation. Corrective
justice puts causation center stage.11 5 The theory states that only
those who actually cause wrongful loss have a duty to repair the
loss. 11 6 The centrality of causation flows from corrective justice's
position as a transactional norm. 117 It states that, when people
interact with each other, they ought to do so in certain ways and
refrain from certain conduct.1 18 Disobeying these interactional rules

111.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 63 ("[B]ecause the plaintiff has
lost what the defendant has gained, a single liability links the particular person who gained to
the particular person who lost. Without some conception such as Aristotle's, private law's linking
of the particular parties becomes a mystery").
112.
The issue is therefore one familiar to economic discussion. The economic analysis of
law focuses on the allocative efficiency properties, hoping to increase the total amount of welfare.
But it does not question the ultimate distribution of welfare. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 296 (1987) (discussing the unimportance of distributive
concerns).
113.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18.
114.
See id.
115.
While economists picked up and ran with the realist disbelief in the cause concept,
philosophers and jurisprudence scholars maintained there is a real meaning to the concept. See,
e.g., H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORIt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 59-63 (2d ed. 1985); Richard A.
Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context, 3 J. TORT L. 6 (2010);
Wright, Actual Causation,supra note 93, at 435.
116.
See Wright, Actual Causation,supra note 93, at 435. However some are not as sold
on the consistency between corrective justice and tort's conception of causation. See, e.g., Larry
A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1
(1987).
117.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 410
(1987).
118.
See id. at 430.
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gives rise to an unequal situation where the tortfeasor gains at the
victim's expense. On the other hand, in the absence of an interaction,
the gains and losses are not connected to one another. In such cases
the inequality is not the result of individual agency but merely good
fortune.1 1 9 When asking whether the defendant caused the plaintiffs
harm, the focus is whether these gains and losses are the result of a
Causation is therefore the
singular, identifiable interaction.1 20
doctrine that requires the gains and losses to be linked together as
flowing from the same wrong, rather than merely unconnected
events.121
However, as so far explicated the theory is purely formal and
not substantive. 122 It tells us what to do once an injustice occurs but
not what is an injustice in the first place. 12 3 Once legitimate holdings
are not given equal respect, the law will rectify the situation. But
what counts as a legitimate holding? And what is equal respect? 124 To
these questions, corrective justice theorists respond that people have
125 Most
some natural right to determine the content of their lives.
notably, Professor Ernest Weinrib argues that Immanuel Kant's
notion of autonomy is inextricably linked with Aristotle's theory of
corrective justice. 126 Each person has an innate right to determine the
purposes of his life. 1 27 Each person has an equal, natural right to live
free from the interference of others. 128 When a tortfeasor causes harm
to another, he uses the victim to further his own ends, without
respecting the victim's equal right to lead his own life. The tortfeasor
subjugates the victim's will to his own. The result is an inequality
with benefits to the defendant and losses to the victim. The law
corrects this situation to restore the balance.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
See id.
See id.

See, e.g., LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 67, at 293-323 (discussing
122.
Weinrib's scholarship).
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 66-68.
123.
See Hans Kelsen, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW,
124.
AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS BY HANS KELSEN 110, 125-36

(1957) (arguing that the lack of substance to the Aristotelian concept made in a pure tautology
that justice is simply the process of giving someone what he deserves).
Coleman views this as stemming from theories of liberalism. See COLEMAN, RISKS
125.
AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at 433 (arguing that the law stems from "equality, respect for
persons, and their well being"); see also LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 67, at
309-10 (describing Coleman's approach).
126.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 84-113.
127.
See id.
See id. Others also see some possibility for a substantive content to the concept of
128.
corrective justice capable of leading to definitions of justice. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 683 (1992).
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This theory is attractive but still somewhat problematic. While
it explains important features of the law that are otherwise unclear,
the theory probably does not explain every part of the law. 129 Reliance
on concepts such as autonomy to ground rights leads to indeterminacy
in many instances. 130 It is often unclear when one person's autonomy
should prevail over the autonomy of another. 3 1 In a tort case, holding
one person liable will often curtail their autonomy in order to uphold
the autonomy of the other. And while deep reflection on Kantian
theory may resolve these issues, there is very little indication from the
judiciary that their focus is solely on upholding Kant's vision of
autonomy.132 It seems more likely that, as Calabresi once said, tort
law is a system of mixed goals. 133 Society recognizes rights for various
reasons, some based on efficiency, and some based on the right
holder's natural rights.13 4 Each highlights a different, but equally
13 5
important, aspect of the system.

II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Corrective justice is also an important function of copyright
law. While the economic theory fails to make sense of the relationship
between the author and infringer, the corrective justice theory
explains this aspect of the law intuitively.

129.
For critiques of corrective justice theory, see Posner, The Concept of Corrective, supra
note 25, at 188; Sugarman, supra note 84, at 603-11.
130.
See e.g., Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 215 ("One might argue that the
principle of autonomy gives no guidance because autonomy claims are always symmetrical. What
one party wants, the other party does not want."). Nevertheless Kantian approaches can be
found in copyright. See, e.g., MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 39, at
68-101; Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 203-24 (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012).
131.
See Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 157.
132.
Tort cases rarely involve highly detailed discussion of Kantian theory.
133.
See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 95, at 100-01.
134.
See Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 156-57, 245-46.
135.
See Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, supra note 25, at 629. Equally
corrective justice is likely supported to some extent by another Aristotelian concept, distributive
justice. See, e.g., TONY HONOR9, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT (1999); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice
and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, On the
Relationship Between Corrective and DistributiveJustice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE:
FOURTH SERIES 237-63 (Jeremy Horder, ed., 2000). For a consideration of distributive justice in
copyright, see Molly S. Van. Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535
(2005).
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A. The Economic Theory of Copyright
The economic theory of copyright is based on the same
principle of efficiency as tort law. 13 6 Resources should be allocated
towards uses that produce welfare. In copyright, however, a market
failure gets in the way of that goal.1 37 Authors often do not have the
socially optimal incentive to create works.' 38 This is the result of the
public-good nature of literary and artistic works. Creating the first
copy requires substantial up-front investment. 139 A rational author
would be unlikely to pay these up-front costs unless he will later
recover the investment. 140 To add to the problem, as the works are
public goods, a copyist can easily duplicate the work and compete with
the author in the market. 141 In the face of this price competition, the
author's ability to recover the up-front expenses diminishes-and
along with it the incentives to create the work. 142 Copyright law
intervenes to prevent this.143 With market exclusivity, the author can
recover the up-front costs and receive the socially optimal incentive to
produce the work.
This theory is the "mirror image" of the economic
interpretation of tort law. 144 The ultimate goal in each is welfare
Accomplishing this in each case requires
maximization.1 45
manipulating the actor's incentives (whether incentivizing the
tortfeasor into taking care or incentivizing the author into creating
works). 146 The requirement for incentive manipulation stems in each
case from a market failure caused by externalities. 147 In tort the
See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. For alternative theories to the standard
136.
incentive rationale, see, for example, Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative
Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005); Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial
OrganizationApproach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004); Tom. G. Palmer,
Intellectual Property:A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261
(1998); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and ProductDifferentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004).
See generally Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 26.
137.
138.
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at
139.
326.
See id.
140.
141.
See id.
142.
See id.
See id.
143.
See Gordon, MirrorImage, supra note 6, at 535.
144.
145.
See id. at 534; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See Gordon, MirrorImage, supra note 6, at 535-37.
146.
147.
See id. The literature on how externalities affect intellectual property is varied and
voluminous. See, e.g., Jerry L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law:
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion
Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065 (2006); Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045,
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externalities are negative-the tortfeasor overproduces torts because
others bear externalized costs. 148 In copyright they are positive-the
author underproduces works because others would reap the
externalized benefits. 149 In each case, resolving the problem requires
the actor to internalize the externalities. 15 0 Holding the tortfeasor
liable for damages internalizes those costs, creating a proper incentive
for fewer accidents. 15 1 Copyright protection allows the author to
consider the long-term benefits of a work when deciding whether to
invest in its creation. The result in both tort and copyright is socially
optimal activity.
B. Problems with the Economic Analysis of Copyright Infringement
Because the economic theory of copyright is similar to the
economic theory of tort, it suffers from exactly the same problem. It
struggles to explain the relationship between the two parties, the
author and infringer. This manifests itself in two ways.
1. Copyright's Bilateral Structure
Like in the tort context, copyright holders enforce their rights
through bilateral litigation.
The author sues the infringer for
compensation.1 52 Using the same questions asked of tort law, it is
clear that the economic theory does not provide a full explanation of
why this bilateralism is necessary. To start, why does the author have
1058-71 (1989); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329, 1330 (1987); Robert P. Merges, Of PropertyRules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized
Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 42 J.
INDUS. ECON. 155 (1994); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers,100 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801 (2009).
148.
See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 534.
149.
See id. at 535.
150.
See id. at 535-37.
151.
See id.
152.
See, e.g., Balganesh, Obligatory Structure,supra note 37, at 1685 (demonstrating the
bilateralism of copyright law). It is true that often modern copyright litigation is far more
complex than a simple author versus infringer case. There are many third parties on both sides.
On the right holder side there are assignees, license holders, publishers, record companies,
collecting societies, etc., while on the infringer side there are websites that host infringing
content, internet service providers, and peer-to-peer network operators. However, the existence
of third parties does not change the basic case two-sided nature of the case before the court. Each
case is a contest between one party that holds a right over the work and someone who has
potentially infringed that right. Even in the case where there are more than one party on each
side of the case, for example in mass copyright litigation, see infra Part III.C., the case is still one
group of parties against another group of parties-much like a soccer match is a team sport but
still bilaterally structured.
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a right to sue this particular copyright infringer? Economists would
answer that providing the author with the right to sue provides an
ability for the author to recover the fixed costs of creating the work
and therefore increases the incentive to produce the work in the first
place. 15 3 If, however, the primary goal is to incentivize the creation of
new works, then it is sufficient to reward the author for creating. This
can be accomplished through non-bilateral means.
The use of
government subsidies is the leading example of this.154 Creation could
be spurred simply by providing ex ante lump sums of money to
authors without the need for any adjudicative system. 15 5 Tax money
would be allocated towards author's fixed costs as it is allocated
towards the salaries of those working in national defense or in the
welfare state. 15 6 Alternatively, institutions could award prizes to
authors who produce the most popular works. 157 These systems would
make an exclusive right to copy and lawsuits for infringements
unnecessary and avoid the cost of copyright enforcement and
litigation.158

153.
See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
154.
Some authors have already commented on the similarity between the grant and the
grant of government regulation via subsidies. See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. H.C. (3d ser.) (1841) 341,
350 (U.K.) (Copyright is "a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers."
(statement of Thomas B. Macaulay)); Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory
Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 231 n.1 (2003); John F. Duffy, The
Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 39-41 (2004).
155.

See

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

INNOVATION,

GOVERNANCE

AND

THE

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 257 (Birgitte Anderson ed., 2006); supra notes 12-14 and
accompanying text.
156.
See Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 136 (2005).
157.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
158.
Some commentators have already highlighted the potential efficiency of these
alternative creation-incentivizing systems. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowtiz & Richard Watt, How to
Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music? Copyright and Its Alternatives,
20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 513 (2006); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Peter Eckersley, The Economic
Evaluation of Alternatives to Digital Copyright, SERCIAC (2003) (preliminary version), available
at http://www.serci.org/2003/eckersley.pdf; see also Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic
Justification for Copyright, SERCIAC (2003) (draft), available at http://www.serci.org/
2003/nadel.pdf. While others recognize more generally that copyright litigation may be wasteful,
see, for example, Michael J. Meurer, ControllingOpportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003), equally, a number of lawyers have argued that
creation will flourish in the absence of a copyright regime. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA &
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012);
Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes
Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1150 (2007); Elizabeth L.
Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP's Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011). These studies
mostly concern the creation of fictional work, for information on copyright alternatives for factual
works, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHT AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES (Robert F. Brauneis ed., 2009).
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Nevertheless, it might be that copyright itself is economically
desirable. The advantage of creating a property right is that it allows
the author to license and sell the work at a price that the market
sets.1 59 Because the market sets the reward, the author is given a
price signal that accurately reflects the social value from the work.
This therefore provides not merely an incentive to create the work but
the socially optimal level of incentive. 160 In this case, the right to sue
the infringer is a second-best tool for the author to recover the fixed
costs. 16 1 Ideally, the copyist would pay the author for the right to use
the work; otherwise, the court will hold the copyist liable. Therefore,
the author can still recover money to offset his initial investment. Yet,
this theory still fails to explain why upon an infringement of the right,
the copyist should receive compensation directly from this particular
infringer. The author's incentive will be equally well served if, upon
an infringement, a government-compensation scheme, an insurance
policy, or a random third party compensates the author.
The
incentives do not rest on where the compensation comes from, only
that someone (anyone) compensates the author and enables him to
recover his costs.
One could approach the same issue from the opposite direction.
Why is it necessary for the copyright infringer to pay this particular
author compensation? The economic theory would say that making
the copyist pay a penalty deters him and future copyists from
breaking the law. 162 But all that is required to deter infringement is
to make the infringer pay a penalty to someone upon illegally copying
the work. This could be in the form of a criminal fine to the
163
government or a donation to a third party such as a charity.
159.
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
355 (1967) (arguing that well defined property rights lead to internalization of externalities and
efficient price signals). As a result some see the economics of property as the key to economics of
intellectual property. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-30 (2000). Others
disagree fundamentally with this explanation for copyright. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann,
Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. (2006) [hereinafter
Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend]; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). However, some of this desire for strong copyright
protection also flows from a natural rights perspective that authors deserve to control all uses of
their work. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL

JUKEBOX 10-11 (rev. ed. 2003) (Copyright maximalists "assert that copyaright is rooted in
natural justice, entitling authors to every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies of
their works.").
160.
See e.g., Frischmann, Evaluatingthe Demsetzian Trend, supra note 159, at 10.
161.
See id.
162.
See, e.g., supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
163.
Criminal provisions are already partially relied upon for this goal. 17 U.S.C. § 506
(2012). The current potential for imprisonment up to five years certainly acts as a deterrent for
the most serious forms of copyright infringement. See generally I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal

2014]

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

275

Once again, there is the question of why compensation is
necessary at all. In tort law, the costs are sunk. 164 The welfare
reducing aspect of the transaction has already taken place. This is
exactly the same situation in copyright law. The welfare producing
part of the transaction has already occurred; the work in question is
already created. Nothing can change that fact. If the court fails to
hold the infringer liable, that will not reduce the enjoyment society
gains from the author's work. Therefore, the only economic reason for
making the infringer liable is the effect it has on future creation.
However, if all that matters is creating incentives for future action,
why make anyone liable in this particular case? This forward-looking
goal could equally be accomplished by stating that such copying in the
future will result in the author receiving compensation from a third
party.
The fundamental problem is that the economic view of
copyright is entirely forward looking, but the main features of a
copyright infringement case are backward looking. 165 The parties are
not singled out because of their relationship to the goal of maximizing
future welfare but because they are related to each other by some
historical event. The author sues the infringer not because doing so
will encourage future creation but because the author feels that the
infringer has hurt him and should compensate him for the damage
caused.
2. Copying and Independent Re-creation
The next point is that the economic theory of copyright law also
struggles to explain doctrines that relate the two parties together. It
Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 311 (2002); Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle
of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 469, 472
(2011); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on
Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 778-79 (2003); Sharon B. Soffer,
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 491, 506 (1987).
164.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
165.
Mark Lemley has already highlighted that two different forms of economic rationale
are important in intellectual property theory. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). There is an ex ante view
which states that intellectual property rights must be provided in order to induce creation and
an ex post view which states continued control after creation will lead facilitate management of
the goods economic potential. See id. Lemley critiques the ex post view and finds it at odds with
the fundamental public-goods nature of intellectual property. See id. This view aids the
argument made here that the only valid economic approach to intellectual property is forward
looking. However, the point of divergence between my argument and Lemley's is that I assert all
of copyright cases (and probably all intellectual property cases generally) are necessarily
backward looking in some measure. The issue before the court and the event they are concerned
with are always ex post, or after the creation. The judgment the court provides has no forwardlooking goals which relates to these two parties and this event which they fight about.
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is unclear why the copyright holder should only be able to enforce his
right against those who actually copy his work.166
Unless the
defendant actually duplicates an existing work, he will not be liable. 167
It is not a copyright infringement to independently re-create the work,
even if the resulting works are identical. 168 The question is whether
this requirement is welfare enhancing.
As an initial matter, one might think it is not. Two reasons
would suggest this doctrine is inefficient. First, presumably the
existence of identical works in the market place will harm the author's
incentives to create, regardless of how it is created. 69
An
independently produced work may still be a substitute for the author's
work and therefore harm his ability to charge a price above marginal
cost. This is largely the reasoning found in patent law, which does not
170
have such an independent re-creation doctrine.
Second, independently re-creating works does not enhance
welfare. Simply reproducing a work does not add something new that
society desires and demands. For example, society already has
produced Don Quixote.' 71 Anyone who obtains value from Don Quixote
can already go out and read it. Re-creating Don Quixote does not add
anything new to that picture. On the other hand, the process of
re-creating Don Quixote actually harms social welfare. The re-creator
spends resources on the re-creation of a work that ultimately satisfies
no demand. This reasoning suggests society should deter independent
re-creation rather than allow it. One way to do this would be to hold
the independent re-creator liable.

166.
See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936); Roworth
v. Wilkes, 1 Campbell 94, 98, 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B. 1807); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 9.2, at 9:5 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT]
(explaining that, in order "[t]o establish copying, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
mechanically copied the plaintiffs work"); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, at 511-14 (1945).
167.
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1949) (stating that
infringement consists of: "(a) that defendant copied from plaintiffs copyrighted work and (b) that
the copying (assuming it to be proved) went to far as to constitute improper appropriation").
168.
See, e.g., Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 450 (7th
Cir. 2001).
169.
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at
344-47.
170.
For a discussion of the efficiency of this doctrine in the patent context, see Mark A.
Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proofof Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007);
Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual
Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. ECON. REV. 92, 95
(2006); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 475 (2006).
171.

MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE INGENIOUS GENTLEMAN DON QUIXOTE OF LA

MANCHA (1605).
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In response to this argument, Professor William Landes and
Judge Richard Posner make two counterarguments to show the
efficiency of the independent re-creation doctrine. 17 2 First, if the
doctrine did not exist, future authors would spend time and incur
additional cost searching for copyrights that they may infringe in the
production of their works.17 3 The independent re-creation doctrine
174
allows them to create without incurring substantial search costs.
And second, the likelihood of re-creating a work is quite low. 75 Given
the chance of re-creation is so low, it makes little sense to spend
76
resources regulating the issue.
These arguments are not as conclusive as they may appear.
Take the first argument. Landes and Posner acknowledge that these
additional search costs must be weighed against the greater incentives
for the author to produce works. 177 Nevertheless, they think that
scrapping the independent re-creation doctrine would lead to many
search costs and only few beneficial incentive effects.1 78 Therefore, it
makes sense to retain the doctrine. 179 But this approach seems to
Eliminating the independent
forget other important variables.
re-creation doctrine would have additional economic benefits Landes
and Posner do not consider. As discussed, independent re-creation is
wholly wasteful. Deterring it would prevent such wasted resources.
In addition, the independent re-creation doctrine makes copyright
litigation substantially more expensive. In order to enforce the right,
the author must demonstrate that the defendant copied the work. 8 0
But proving copying is very difficult. Copying takes place in private,
and, unless there are witnesses, the author must rely on the
infringer's admission of copying or circumstantial evidence.' 8'
See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at
172.
344-47; see also Varian, supranote 156, at 128.
173.
Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at 344-47.
See id.
174.
See id.
175.
176.
See id.
See id.
177.
178.
See id.
See id.
179.
180.
See e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1949).
Due to the difficulties of proving copying, the court has modified the author's burden.
181.
See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Jona Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) ("In
order to prove infringement a plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and copying by
Since direct evidence of copying is rarely, if ever, available, a plaintiff may
the defendant ....
prove copying by showing access and 'substantial similarity' of the two works." (internal citation
omitted) (citing Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751,
753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 141 (1976))). Now copying may be
inferred through a mixture of evidence that the defendant had access to the work and the work
he created was substantially similar. See id. However, the court has never abandoned the
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Therefore, while the independent re-creation doctrine does reduce the
search costs of the second author, it is not clear whether that benefit
outweighs the combined costs of decreased author incentive, the costs
of proving copying in court, and the cost of using resources to produce
a work that does not enhance welfare.
Additionally, it may be the case that reintroducing some type of
formality to copyright law could reduce the independent re-creator's
search costs. Placing a requirement upon the initial author to insert a
description of his work into a public database would substantially
reduce the costs for follow-on creators while not requiring great
expenditure on behalf of the original author.1 8 2 This, however, may
not be a perfect solution in every case. Naturally, complex works such
as Don Quixote would not be perfectly describable, and the value of
putting an ill-fitting description into a formal database would be less
than optimal. But even a limited description would give follow-on
creators some indication of the works already in existence, and they
could use that to start their search.
The second argument is also far from fully persuasive. The
notion that independent re-creation is unlikely to occur depends
entirely on how the law defines re-creation. A work will currently be
18 3
considered a re-creation if it is substantially similar to the original.
If the law defines substantial similarity narrowly, then independent
re-creation is unlikely. For example, if substantial similarity means
verbatim copying, then it is very unlikely that a work like Don Quixote
will ever be re-created. However, if substantial similarity is very
broad, then the likelihood of re-creation rises greatly.
Currently, the courts favor a very broad view of substantial
18 4
similarity. Consider Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company.
necessity that sufficient evidence must demonstrate that the infringer copied the work. See id.;
see also 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 9.2, at 9:5-6 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008);
Alan Latman, "ProbativeSimilarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (1990). For a discussion on the merits of
the independent re-creation doctrine, see William Patry, Independent Creation: A Bulwark of
Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (June 22, 2005), http://williampatry.blogspot.com
2005/06/independent-creation-bulwark-of.html.
182.
For example, a number of authors have proposed reintroducing formalities recently.
See, e.g., STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY,

RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2011); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57
STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, PreliminaryThoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 551, 562-63 (2007). However, others are less certain about the merits of such a
scheme. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities:
A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010).
183.
See e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69; Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright
Decisionmaking: The Meaningless of SubstantialSimilarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987).
184.
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); see also BSS
Studio, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 1999 WL 1427831, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (mem.); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 9.3, at 9:24-38 (2005 & Supps. 2006, 2011, 2012-2). The concept of
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In that case, the plaintiff produced greeting cards with some original
The defendant
illustrations and some public-domain sayings.1 8 5
produced its own cards with somewhat similar illustrations and the
same phrases.18 6 The trial court determined that the illustrations
were not similar enough to constitute an infringement and that the
phrases were not protectableI l7 The appellate court did not dispute
these holdings but found that if one aggregated the phrases, the
illustration, along with the mood and sentiment of the two cards,
there was substantial similarity between them.18 8 The defendant was
liable for copying the "total concept and feel" of the card. 8 9 This
serves to demonstrate just how broad substantial similarity can be
and accordingly demonstrates a high likelihood of re-creation. If one
can re-create merely by producing a work similar in concept and feel
to a preexisting work, then the chances of independent re-creation are
not as small as Landes and Posner suggest. Therefore, there is
substantial reason to believe that the necessity of copying does not
further copyright's economic goals.
C. Corrective Justice Theory and Copyright Infringement
The point of this Article is not to completely dismiss the
economic theory of copyright. Copyright in common law legal systems
is still primarily a tool for increasing social welfare. 190 However,
beliefs and intuitions about fairness and individual responsibility
constrain and structure what societies do in the name of welfare
maximization. 19 1 As a result, corrective justice is still an important
part of the law. In deciding copyright cases, courts not only attempt to
maximize welfare, but also try to correct a wrong that the infringer
has inflicted upon the author.
The corrective justice theory of copyright infringement is as
follows: Rights are assigned over the work.1 92 Primarily, the author
receives the exclusive right to copy, and the user receives the right of

substantial similarity may indeed be so wide as to threaten other doctrines limiting copyright.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 183, at 758-67.
See Roth Greeting Cards, 419 F.2d at 1109.
185.
See id. at 1107.
186.
187.
See id. at 1109.
See id. at 1110.
188.
189.
See id.
190.
See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(stating that copyright is "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors").
For a similar point on the relationship between personality interests and welfare
191.
maximization in copyright, see Balganesh, Normativity, supra note 37.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
192.
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fair use. 193 Various arguments justify this distribution of rights.
Some are consequentialist in nature, such as the economic theory or
theories based on visions of ideal societies. 194 Other reasons are based
in natural rights theory. 195 The author of a work has a certain amount
of control over the work because he labored to produce it, and, in doing
so, he imbued it with his personality. 196 Thereafter, when parties
interact, they have a duty to respect the rights of the other. The user
must respect the author's rights just as the author must equally
respect the user's rights. When the user does not respect the author's
rights, an inequality occurs. The infringement allows the infringer to
gain something at the author's expense. At this point, corrective
justice theory states that the person who has caused wrongful loss has
a duty to rectify the loss. The function of copyright law is to restore
the equality between author and infringer. This involves removing
the wrongful gain from the infringer and using it to compensate the
wrongful loss of the author. 9 7 In both tort and copyright infringement
cases, the remedy puts the parties back in the positions they were in
prior to the infringement and restores their antecedent equality.
The question is what are the wrongful losses and the wrongful
gains? In a basic case, the wrongful loss is the owner's lost revenue
from the work, while the wrongful gain is the money the infringer
saves by not paying the author the relevant license to copy the
work. 98 Take the situation where an infringer wrongfully produces a
single copy of an author's work. The author loses the value that he
could have made from licensing that copy, while the copyright
infringer gains a corresponding amount, the amount of the unpaid
license fee. For example, if the license fee is set at five dollars per
copy, the plaintiff has lost five dollars while the infringer has avoided
spending five dollars. 199 When the infringer pays the author the five
dollars, it restores equilibrium and corrects the injustice.
193.
See id. §§ 106-107.
194.
See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 4; WEINRIB, IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 61.
195.
See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 74.
196.
See Hughes, supranote 38, at 330-38.
197.
It is less certain whether this is an appropriate goal of patent law and some have
argued against such an approach. See Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law
"Private Law" Remedies, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1932834; cf. Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 234 (2014) (arguing that the public's interest in efficiently resolving patent
disputes should be considered).
198.
See Fitzgerald Publ'g Co. v. Baylor Publ'g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §14.02 (1987)).

199.
Courts sometimes use alternative language to measure the lost market value in
these cases. Sometimes they say the lost market value is the lost sales themselves. See, e.g.,
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008) (actual damages set
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Alternatively, consider the situation in which the copyist copies
the work and freely distributes it to one thousand other consumers.
Assume that the one-thousand consumers would have bought the
work otherwise. The author therefore loses the revenue from the
one-thousand sales. If he still charges five dollars per copy, he loses
On the other hand, the copyright infringer gains a
$5000.
corresponding amount by not paying for a license to distribute the
work to the one-thousand consumers. If the infringer had originally
sought a license from the author, the author would have charged a
price equivalent or higher than the amount he would have gained
from making those one thousand sales himself. The minimum license
fee the copyright author would likely accept would be $5000. By
bypassing the market, the infringer has avoided a $5000 license fee
while causing $5000 in loss to the author. Correcting this injustice
requires the infringer pay the owner $5000.
relationship
This theory makes the author-infringer
meaningful and intuitive. Copyright cases are bilateral because the
infringer has a duty to correct an inequality he caused. The act of
copying has allowed the infringer to gain something at the author's
expense. To address this, the author must sue the infringer, and the
infringer must hand over his ill-wrought gains. Naturally, the judicial
task is a backwards-looking one. To do justice-undo the situation,
redistribute the costs, and return the parties to the positions they
existed in prior to the transaction-the court looks to the past.
The theory also explains why it is necessary that the infringer
copy the author's work rather than merely re-create it.200 Like actual
causation in tort law, the act of copying is the nexus between the two
When someone interacts with the author's work, the
parties.
corrective justice norm requires that he treat the author's rights with
respect. Copying the work unlawfully breaks that equality and results
at approximately $50 because the defendant "infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs-the
equivalent of approximately three CDs--costing less than $54 .... "); Design Res., Inc. v. John
Wolf Decorative Fabrics, 1985 WL 2445, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1985) ("[Dlefendant's infringing
pattern was sold at a price only slightly lower than plaintiffs. It is, therefore, reasonable to
assume that plaintiff would have sold the same amount of the copyrighted fabric as defendant
sold of the infringing fabric."); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
On the other hand, sometimes the court frames the loss in terms of a lost license fee. See, e.g.,
Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 2011 WL 3862074, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("The jury was instructed
as to both the fair market value license calculation for actual damages . . . . "); Thoroughbred
Software Int'l, Inc. v. Dice Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the actual
damages were the license fees the plaintiff would have charged for the work's use and
distribution if it were not for the infringement); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supranote
166, § 14.1-1.1, at 14:4-22:3 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps. 2008, 2009, 2011-1, 2012-2, 2013).
Although not explicitly talking about corrective justice, Wendy Gordon has already
200.
shown how the copying requirement in copyright law is analogous to the cause-in-fact
requirement in tort law. See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 536-37.

282

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:2:251

in correspondingly wrongful gains and losses. On the other hand, if
there is no copying, it is not the interaction between the parties which
gives rise to the gains and losses. The re-creation may benefit the
user while causing losses for the author (who must now contend with
a new work in the market), but these gains and losses are not linked
together as the result of a singular interaction. Much like the case
where an infinite number of monkeys with an infinite number of
typewriters could duplicate the works of Shakespeare, the re-creation
is not the result of human agency but of mere fate. The copying
requirement is thus the judicial tool used to ensure that the gains and
losses are connected as part of the same wrong.
1. Copyright Remedies
A basic function of copyright law is to correct the wrongful
gains and wrongful losses that copying causes. The remedy imposed
by the court makes this goal a reality. This is most simply seen in the
actual-damages remedy. The actual-damages provision requires the
infringer to compensate the owner for the lost market value of the
work. 20 1 This situation corresponds to the examples just discussed.
The infringer has bypassed the market and copied the work without
paying the relevant license fee, while the author has lost the potential
license fee or the profits to the unlicensed competitor. Compensation
puts the parties back on the baseline they existed in prior to the
infringement. But corrective justice can also be seen to operate in all
of the copyright remedies, not merely in the provision of actual
damages. As this section will illustrate, corrective justice exists in the
author's ability to receive the infringer's profits, the statutory damage
regime, and the availability of injunctive relief.
The law not only provides monetary remedies in the form of
actual damages but also allows the copyright owner to receive "any
additional profits of the infringer."20 2 This additional remedy is a form
of disgorgement damages and functions to compensate the author's
lost right to profit from his work. 20 3 The author's entitlement includes
the right to receive profits through selling and licensing the work.
When the copyist uses the work for financial gain, the author loses

201.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2012).
202.
See id.; see also Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512
(9th Cir. 1985); Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1172-73; 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.1.2, at 14:22.3-38 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supps. 2008, 2011, 2011-1, 2012, 2012-2); Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the
Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21
AIPLA Q.J. 91, 92-93 (1993).
203.
See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
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part of his right-the ability to profit from the work. This foregone
gain is a loss and can only be remedied by the user returning the gain
he has made from his unlawful exploitation of the work. Consider
again the case where the defendant copies one work that carries a
five-dollar license fee. Now imagine the defendant copies the work
and sells the copy to someone else for one dollar. The copyright owner
has not only lost the license fee of five dollars but has also lost the
chance to make an additional one dollar from the sale to the third
party. Therefore, the copyright owner must recover six dollars to
correct the wrongful loss and wrongful gain.
What, then, of statutory damages? The law provides statutory
damages in two situations. First, where actual damages are hard to
20 4
prove, the copyright owner can elect to receive statutory damages.
As Professor Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland have already
205
demonstrated, this provision exists to serve a compensatory goal.
The owner frequently cannot prove actual damages, despite their
probable existence. 206 Take the previous example in which the copyist
distributed the work to 1000 people. 20 7 In order to prove actual
damages, the owner must prove that these consumers would have
208
bought the work from the owner were it not for the infringement.
But such a hypothesis is almost beyond empirical proof; it requires
demonstrating the existence of a counterfactual reality. 20 9 Allowing
the owner to select a statutorily set amount provides compensation for
a harm that very likely has occurred but is difficult to show. 210 It is a
form of rough justice, an attempt to correct the injustice that has
occurred despite evidentiary difficulties. The alternative would be to
let many injustices go completely without rectification. However, this
cannot be said for the second case in which statutory damages are
awarded. This second case involves providing additional damages (up
to $150,000 per infringed work) when the copying was both unlawful
204.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.2,
at 14:39-64.1 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps. 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012-2, 2013, 2013-1).
205.
See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009); see also Oren Bracha, The
Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal
Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427 (2010) (tracing the evolution of statutory damages
from the British Statute of Anne 1710 to present day); Priscilla Ferch, Statutory Damages Under
the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 489 (1984).
206.
See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 446-51 (discussing statutory
damages under the 1909 Act).
207.
See supra Part II.C.
208.
See 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 166, §14.1.1, at 14:8-12 (3d ed. 2005).
209.
It is often difficult to guarantee the certainty of empirical proof. See, e.g., Steven
Linen Assocs., Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F.
Supp. 571, 582 (D. Mass. 1985).
210.
See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 446-51.
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and willful. 211 This is a complex issue and will be discussed further in
Part III.
Finally, injunctions awarded by the court against the copyright
infringer also serve corrective justice. 21 2 In corrective justice, the
purpose of the remedy is to restore the equality after an infringement
and maintain that equality in the future. 213 In this latter form,
214
corrective justice may be better described as "protective justice."
When there is a realistic threat that the infringer will continue to
infringe in the future, the court will provide compensatory damages
and an injunction. As a result, "corrective justice operates not only by
requiring the defendant to repair a wrong once it has occurred, but
also by granting the plaintiff an injunction that prevents the
21 5
defendant from extending the wrong into the future."
III. CORRECTIVE INJUSTICES IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Corrective justice is an important feature of copyright. The
infringer's duty to rectify the harm is the principle around which
copyright infringement is structured. Sadly, courts and lawmakers
often have forgotten this point. 216 The focus is almost entirely on
economic concerns, which leads to unfair laws. This section highlights
211.
See infra Part III.A.1.
212.
See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 13.2.1, at 13:33-46 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps.
2008, 2012-2, 2013-1). Although corrective justice supports the use of injunctions in certain
cases, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the circumstances in which they ought to be
used. For a discussion of this issue from a non-corrective justice perspective, see, for example,
Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay -- Four-FactorFatigueor FourFactor Freedom, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 449 (2008); H. TomAs G6mez-Arostegui, What
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Jiarui Liu,
Copyright Injunctions after eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS. & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012);
James Thompson, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Infringement: Moral and Economic
Justifications for Balancing Individual Rights Instead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 477 (1998).
213.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 408 (1992).
214.
Schwartz, supra note 25, at 1832.
215.
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 94-95; see also James E. Duffy, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INC., THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (1969).
216.
For other instances of the corrective justice theory's application to modern day
issues, see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warning,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (2007); Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577 (1997); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional
Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990); Elbert L.
Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 741 (2000);
Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
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three areas that do not conform to the corrective justice function of
copyright: statutory damages for willful infringement, attorney fees,
and mass copyright-infringement settlements.
A. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement
In copyright, the author in a civil case can often receive
heightened damages against the infringer when the infringement is
willful. 217 To the extent that these are punitive, these damages are
unjust and in need of reform.
1. Punitive Civil Damages Are Unjust
Under the corrective justice theory, punitive damages are
unjust. 2 18 Punishment is an appropriate goal of criminal law but is
not appropriate in civil cases.2 19 When employed in civil litigation,
Whereas
punitive damages overcompensate the plaintiff.220
compensatory damages return the parties to original position, punitive
damages go one step further and create a new inequality. The court
forces the defendant to pay an extra-compensatory lump sum, while
the plaintiff receives a windfall payment that he has no compensatory
claim to. This extra-compensatory fee is simply unnecessary to correct
the injustice. 22 1 And rather than put the parties back in their original
positions, these damages make the plaintiff better off at the
defendant's expense.
In copyright, the statute authorizes heightened damages in
222
cases of willful infringement (up to $150,000 per infringed work).
Courts recognize the punitive function of these awards. 223 This
217.

See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).

218.

See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 169-74. As a result, other

common law jurisdictions have chosen to limit their reach. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964]
A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (U.K.) (limiting punitive damages to the cases in which it already existed and
preventing further expansion).
219.
See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supranote 15, at 169-74.
220.
See id.
See id.
221.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
222.
223.
See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The purpose of
punitive damages-to punish and prevent malicious conduct-is generally achieved under the
Copyright Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), which allow increases to an award
of statutory damages in cases of willful infringement." (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02[B], at 14-23 to 24 (1999); Kamakazi Music Corp. v.
Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))); Nat'l Football League v. PrimeTime
24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that statutory damages
are "partially punitive" (citing RSO Records., Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952); U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde
Entm't Corp., 1998 WL 401532, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998))); U.S. Media Corp., 1998 WL
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punishment rationale leads to damages that are very high and far
beyond a compensatory amount. 224 For instance, consider the case of
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com. 22 5 In that case, the defendant made
digital copies of 4700 CDs to develop a music database. 226 Sections of
the database were then made available to customers who had lawfully
obtained the CDs from elsewhere. 227 MP3.com made little if any profit
from its actions, and the plaintiff did not present adequate evidence to
prove actual damage. 228
Nevertheless, the court found willful
infringement and awarded $118 million in damages, which the parties
later reduced to $53.4 million through a settlement. 229 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a $31.68 million statutory-damages award
against the defendant in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures for the
unauthorized retransmission of television programs. 230 The punitive
nature of these staggering awards has caused some commentators to
23 1
call for their revisions.
401532, at *18 (recognizing statutory damages' "punitive purposes"); Kamazkazi Music Corp. v.
Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ('The public policy rationale for
punitive damages of punishing and preventing malicious conduct can be properly accounted for
in the provisions for increasing a maximum statutory damage award [for willful
infringements].").
224.
See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn.
2008); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 441-43.
225.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ.472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568
(S.D.N.Y. Sept 6., 2000). Some of the criticisms against this case have sounded remarkably
corrective justice-like in tone. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT §14.04[E][1] (2008) ("Absent any nexus between damage to plaintiff and benefit to
defendant at any magnitude even roughly comparable to that awarded, the result is to introduce
randomness or worse into the litigation calculus.").
226.
See UMG Recordings, Inc., 2000 WL 1262568 at *2,*6.
227.
See id. at *2.
228.
See id. at *5.
229.
See id. at *1, *6; Amy Harmon, Deal Settles Suit Against MP3.com, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/15/business/technology-deal-settles-suit-againstmp3com.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fImes%2Topics%2fPeople%2fl%2fHarmon%2c%2OAmy.
230.
See Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259
F.3d 1186, 1189-91 (9th Cir. 2001).
231.
See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 445 ("The application of
statutory damages has too often strayed from the largely compensatory impulse underlying
statutory damages . . .and has focused too heavily on deterrence and punishment by holding
many ordinary infringements to be willful, which has resulted in many awards that are punitive
in effect and often in intent."); see also J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle
Against Illegal File-Sharing:The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages
for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004); Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory
Damage Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and
Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265 (2009); Alan E. Garfield,
Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages to Promote Speech, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2010);
Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for
Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010);
Scheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class
Actions, 74 Mo. L. REV. 103 (2009).
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To the extent that statutory damages are punitive in nature,
they are unjust. Punishing the copyist may be an appropriate goal,
but it should be confined to the criminal copyright provisions. The
current punitive nature of statutory damages for willful infringement
allows the author to recover damages that go well beyond
compensation and are unnecessary to rectify the wrongful gain and
loss thereby arising. Instead of returning the parties to their equal
pre-infringement positions, the remedy serves to create further
inequalities. It inflicts a wrongful loss on the infringer, who must pay
money for damage he did not inflict. Simultaneously, it confers a
wrongful benefit on the author, who receives a windfall payment for a
harm he has not suffered. This is simply not necessary to correct the
injustice.
2. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement as Dignitary Harm
It is not necessary, however, to abolish the concept of
It is enough to
heightened damages for willful infringement.
recognize the situations in which such heightened damages perform a
legitimate corrective goal. In various common law jurisdictions, courts
award additional damages when the defendant's willful actions were
so egregious and wanton that they caused a unique form of dignitary
injury. In UK and Canadian tort law, courts award "aggravated"
damages in cases in which the defendant's intentional conduct
demonstrates a blatant disregard for the plaintiffs legitimate
rights. 23 2 When a defendant intentionally harms a plaintiffs right, he
not only harms a legitimate interest, but causes separate harm by
treating the plaintiffs legitimate interest as less worthy than his own
interest.2 3 3 In that case, the damage award is consistent with
corrective justice theory because it still performs a compensatory
34
function: it compensates for the harm to the rights holder's dignity.
In the United States, this theory has had less explicit consideration.
Nevertheless, the theory garners discussion.2 35 Professor Dan Dobbs's

232.
See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (U.K.); Allan Beever, The
Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 89 (2003); John
Murphy, The Nature and Domain of Aggravated Damages, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 357 (2010).
233.
See Beever, supranote 232, at 89.
234.

See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 96.

235.

See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION

262 (2d ed. 1993) ("[Tjhe idea does not seem to be that the plaintiff really has pecuniary loss and
that the only problem is proving it. Nor does it seem to be that the plaintiff has actual
substantial emotional harm that is unproven. Rather the idea seems to be that some rights are
"valuable" in an important although intangible way, even if their loss does not lead to either
pecuniary loss or compensable emotional harm. The invasion of such a right is harm for which
damages are recoverable.").
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treatise on remedies notes that in certain cases damages may reflect
the inherent value of rights and that this sometimes may justify
damages compensating for harms beyond simple pecuniary or
236
emotional losses.
This suggests a legitimate reason for heightening the damage
awards in cases of willful infringement. The owner is a legitimate
rights holder, and attacks on that status are harmful in addition to
any lost license fees that may also result. 237 A copyist who willfully
disregards a copyright owner's rights must compensate the owner for
the affront to dignity as well as any economic losses. In cases like
MP3.com and Feltner, the owner should be able to argue that the
infringer treated his rights with impunity and therefore the infringer
should compensate him for any lost dignity.
If, however, this is the only corrective justice rationale
appropriate for imposing additional damages, the courts would
necessarily impose these damages less often and in smaller amounts
than is current practice. First, it is likely that statutory damages
under this theory would result in lower damages than seen in the
cases such as MP3.com and Feltner. The aggravated damage is still
compensatory in nature, and therefore the damage is limited to the
amount needed to compensate the copyright owner for his dignitary
interest. Such a calculation for nonpecuniary harm is necessarily
complicated, but it is unlikely to yield a very high value. Dobbs's
treatise notes that such dignitary interests rarely "warrant significant
awards of money." 238 This is exemplified in defamation damages. If a
defamed plaintiff cannot show any actual damage, courts will only
award nominal damages to compensate for the harm done to his
position as a right holder. 239 These can often be as low as one dollar.
This suggests that dignitary harm alone will yield small statutory
damage awards, a conclusion that is buttressed by the fact that the
plaintiff has the burden to prove the existence of a compensable
dignitary loss.
Second, courts would not award these damages in cases in
which the users reasonably believed that their actions were fair use or
otherwise noninfringing.
Unfortunately, courts have previously

236.
See id.
237.
For the economic theory of statutory damages, see Christopher Buccafusco & Jason
Masur, Innovation and Incarceration:An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property
Law, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
238.
See DOBBS, supra note 235, at 308.
239.
See id. at 266; see, e.g., Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950-51 (1st Cir. 1989);
see also Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for Defamation, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120,
146 (1933).
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shown willingness to impose liability in such cases. 240 In MP3.com,
the users had a plausible, although ultimately unsuccessful, fair use
claim. 24 1 The copyists made little if any profit and the rights holders
could show no actual market harm. 242 Nevertheless, the court held
them accountable for heightened statutory damages. 243
Such an
outcome is nonsensical under the corrective justice view of aggravated
damages.
It is impossible to blatantly and wantonly disregard
someone's rights while simultaneously believing that your actions do
not harm the other person's rights. To make a nonfrivolous claim that
one's use is noninfringing is the exact opposite of dignity harm. It is
an acceptance that the author has rights but a reasonable denial that
they apply in this case. Accordingly, honestly held beliefs that
conduct is fair use or noninfringing should not result in heightened
statutory damages for willful infringement.
B. Attorney's Fees
Corrective justice supports the position that the losing party
should pay the winning party's reasonable legal fees. 2 4 4 In a typical
tort case in which the injurer harms a victim, the injury does not
simply extend to the physical and emotional harms inflicted, but also
includes the expense the victim incurred vindicating his right in
court. 245 The injurer's actions forced the victim into paying attorney's
fees simply to uphold his legitimate right. In order to correct the
entire injustice, the injurer must remove this element of the wrongful
loss. Only by doing this will the victim be made whole and be restored
to the pre-tort position he occupied.
Copyright litigation currently follows the rule that each party
pays his own legal fees. 246 This leads to the problematic situation in
240.
See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supranote 205, at 443.
241.
See id. at 462.
242.
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ.472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568,
at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 6., 2000); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 462.
243.
See UMG Recordings, Inc., 2000 WL 1262568, at *5.
244.
See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 657-60 (1982).
245.
See id.
246.
See 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.3, at 14:64.2-90 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supps. 2007, 2010-1, 2012, 2013, 2013-1). The presumption is that fees will lie with each party
and the court has discretion whether to shift those fees. For successful instances of fee shifting,
see, for example, Christian v. Mattel Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); The Crescent
Publ'g Group, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 246 F.3d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring an
evidentiary hearing to determine the proprietary of fee awards); Rosciszweski v. Arete Assocs.,
Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 1993); Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir.
1988). This is consistent with usual civil case practice. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
306 (1796); 1 MARY F. DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES
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which the party with the greatest ability to pay for litigation is more
likely to win the case.
In contrast, corrective justice suggests
changing the rule so that the losing party pays the winning party's
litigation fees. 247 The infringement has not only caused the author to
suffer lost market value but has also caused him to spend resources
vindicating his rights. Only by making the infringer pay the author's
legal fees will the injustice be completely removed.
Similarly, when the copyist wins the case, the author ought to
pay the legal fees. This is particularly important in fair use litigation.
Professor Peter Menell and Professor Ben Depoorter have recently
highlighted that many copyists are wary of relying on the fair use
doctrine because of its uncertain applicability. 248 To rectify this
situation, they propose a system in which the author would pay the
fair user's litigation costs under certain conditions. 249 Although
Menell and Depoorter's argument is economic in focus, it is also
consistent with corrective justice. The user's fair use actions were
entirely lawful and within his right. The author has wrongfully
brought a case and thus forced the user to incur losses in defending
something that he was already legally entitled to do. Therefore, to
correct the injustice the litigation has caused, the author must pay the
wrongfully incurred legal fees of the user.
C. Mass Copyright Infringement Settlements
In the corrective justice view of copyright, the wrongdoer ought
to pay for the wrong committed. This might seem a rather bland and
unobjectionable statement. However, in some cases, the law operates
so that innocent people must remedy an injustice they have not
caused. This process can be observed in the current controversy
surrounding mass copyright infringement enforcement campaigns.
The term "copyright troll" refers colloquially to an author (or
more accurately, the copyright holder) that files mass numbers of
copyright infringement cases in the hope of extracting a damage
(1992) (defining as the "American Rule" that each party pays their own legal costs); John
Leubsdorf, Towards a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).

247.
See Rowe, supra note 244, at 657-60.
248.
See Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Copyright Fee Shifting: A Proposalto Promote
Fair Use and Fair Licensing (U. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 2159325, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2159325;
see also Charles
Ossola, Registrationand Remedies: Recovery of Attorney's Fees and Statutory Damages Under the
Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559 (1995).On the debate whether fair use
is clear and predictable, see, for example, Matthew Sag, PredictingFair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47
(2012); Pamela Samuelson, UnbundlingFair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009).
249.
See Menell & Depoorter, supranote 248.
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settlement from defendants as a revenue stream. 250 The author works
in conjunction with technology companies to monitor peer-to-peer
networks. 251 After discovering Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that
are using these networks, the copyright holder files a
copyright-infringement lawsuit against numerous (sometimes
thousands) unnamed defendants. 252 This allows the copyright holder
to secure a subpoena against the relevant Internet Service Provider
(ISP) to release the names and contact information of the people who
After
own the computers associated with the IP addresses. 253
to all
sends
out
letters
obtaining this information, the copyright owner
of the defendants threatening litigation for suspected copyright
infringement, unless the defendant settles the case. 254 The letters
point out how high the statutory damage award can be in order to
induce the defendant into settling the case quickly for only a few
255
thousand dollars.
One example of this practice surrounds Kathryn Bigelow's
Oscar-winning film, The Hurt Locker. 256 Voltage Pictures held the
copyright to the film. 257 In 2010, the law firm representing Voltage
Pictures hired a company to monitor peer-to-peer networks for illegal
downloading of The Hurt Locker.258 In March 2010, Voltage Pictures
filed a lawsuit against five thousand unnamed defendants, later
It then proceeded to send out
increased to 24,595.259
copyright infringement notices to all of the defendants. 260 More
recently, the copyright holders of pornographic films have adopted this

See, e.g., James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass
250.
Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79 (2012);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
251.
See DeBriyn, supra note 250, at 90-92.
See id.
252.
See id. at 94.
253.
254.
See id. at 98.
255.
See Cindy Cohn, Mass Copyright Litigation: New Challenge for the Federal Courts,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/masscopyright-litigation-new-challenge-federal.
See Complaint at 1, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1 - 5,000, No. 1:10-cv-00873
256.
(D.D.C. May 24, 2010), 2010 WL 4955131; First Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement
at 1, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Vasquez, No. 1:10-cv-000873 (D.D.C. May 31, 2011), 2011 WL
2681946; see also Jared Moya, "Hurt Locker" Producers to Sue "Tens of Thousands" of FileSharers, ZEROPAID (May 12, 2010), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/89122[hurt-locker-producersto-sue-tens-of-thousands-of-file-sharers.
257.
See Complaint, supra note 256, at 1.
See DeBriyn, supra note 250, at 93.
258.
See id. at 80.
259.
260.
See id. at 98.
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method of revenue generation. 2 61 In such cases, the copyright holders
have relied partially on the stigma associated with their content in
order to induce a quick settlement from people who would prefer not
to be exposed as consumers-or even alleged consumers--of
262
pornography.
This presents an unhappy situation in which innocent people
pay copyright settlement fees. 263 This may happen because of a
number of reasons. To begin, there is an evidentiary issue over
whether the IP address identified actually downloaded the
copyrighted work. To gather the initial IP addresses, the copyright
owner relies on software and monitoring services of a private, for-hire
company. 264 There is no legal oversight of this process, and there is a
high potential for abuse. From the author's perspective, discovering
the names of as many people as possible is beneficial regardless of
whether they actually infringed the copyright. A greater number of
names offers a larger pool of defendants to whom the copyright owner
can send infringement notices and settlement demands.
Some
copyright owners may therefore have a motive to pursue people
without strong evidence that an infringement has actually occurred.
Alternatively, even in cases in which there is no malicious intent, the
chance of erroneously naming an innocent defendant is substantial.
When the author targets several thousand potential defendants at
once, there is a chance that human error will lead to the author
pursuing some people who have not actually infringed the work.
Even when the author can definitively show that the named IP
address downloaded the work, problems persist. The current practice
of equating the owner of the named IP address and the infringer is at
best questionable. Such a simplistic view does not take into account
IP spoofing, whereby someone creates an IP address with the

261.
See Mike Masnick, More Porn Companies Filing Mass Lawsuits Against File
Sharers, TECHDIRT (July 21, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100719/
17330710283.shtml.
262.
For other instances of the same copyright enforcement behavior, see, for example,
Mick Haig Productions E.K. v. Does 1-670, 687 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2012); Combat Zone v. Does 11037, No. 3:10-cv-00095-JPB-JES (N.D.W.V. Dec.16, 2010).
263.
As a result, a number of such cases have been dismissed by courts. See Eva Galperin,
Over 40,000 Does Dismissed in

Copyright Troll Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION

(Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/02/over-40-OOO-does-dismissed-copyrighttroll-cases; see, e.g., A.F. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 3:12-cv-0519 (D.D.C. June 20, 2012)
(dismissing the case on the grounds that an IP address was insufficient linkage between the
defendant and the infringer).
264.
In the Hurt Locker case the plaintiffs hired Guardeley Ltd. to collect the data on
potential infringers. See Plaintiffs Opposition to Motions to Quash/Motions to Dismiss at 5,
Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 1:10-cv-00873-RMU (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010), 2010 WL
4954765.
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intention of impersonating another IP address. 265 Nor does it
recognize that multiple people, not merely the owner, may use the
infringing device. 266 Even in cases in which the named defendant
actually downloaded the work, his actions may well have been26 exempt
7
from copyright infringement under a defense, such as fair use.
These problems make it likely that authors in these cases are
demanding damage settlements from some innocent people. 268 Of the
pool of innocent people receiving these demands, many would rather
settle the case anonymously than fight publicly in court. Paying a
settlement fee of a few thousand dollars may be preferable to
litigation, in which the defendant would certainly pay substantial
legal fees and risk incurring very high statutory damages if he loses
269
the case.
mass-infringement
such
through
copyright
Enforcing
and may be
properties
settlements may well have cost-saving
consistent with copyright's economic rationale. Grouping defendants
together is far less costly than pursuing thousands of defendants
through thousands of individual cases. The fact that the costs are
reduced also enables the author to more effectively police his rights,
thus increasing the probability of catching infringers holding them
liable. This enhanced enforcement increases the effective deterrence
of the copyright law.
However, to the extent that this practice enables targeting of
innocent defendants, it presents a clear and unambiguous
corrective justice violation. These two parties never interacted before
the litigation. The innocent defendant has not copied the work and
has not benefited at the author's expense. There is no injustice here to
correct. On the contrary, it is the action of the author that creates an

265.

See generally Toby Ehrenkranz & Jun Li, On the State of IP Spoofing Defense, 9

ACM TRANSACTIONS INTERNET TECH. (TOIT) (2009).

See e.g., Order & Report Recommendation at 6, K-Beech, Inc. v. John Does 1-37, No.
266.
2:11-cv-03995 DRH-GRB (D.D.C. May 1, 2011) (Brown, G.) ("[I]t is no more likely that the
subscriber to an IP address carried out a particular computer function-here the purported
illegal downloading of a single pornographic film-than to say an individual who pays the
telephone bill made a specific telephone call.").
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
267.
See, e.g., Order Vacating Prior Early Discovery Orders and Order to Show Cause at
268.
1-2, AF Holdings, LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-5709-ODW(Jcx) ("An IP address alone may yield
subscriber information, but that may only lead to the person paying for the internet service and
not necessarily the actual infringer, who may be a family member, roommate, [or] employee ....
This Court has a duty to protect the innocent citizens of this district from this sort of legal
shakedown, even though a copyright holder's rights may be infringed by a few deviants.").
See DeBriyn, supra note 250, at 98-99; Timothy B. Lee, Enraged by Abusive Law
269.
Suits, Anonymous Troll Slayers Fight Back, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/enraged-by-abusive-lawsuits-annymus-trll-slayersare-fighting-back.
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inequality. The author wrongfully gains from the transaction; he
receives a ransom masquerading as compensatory damages. On the
other hand, the innocent defendant is forced into a wrongful loss in
the form of the settlement fee. This is the injustice that the law
should correct.
The problem would largely disappear if the law adopted the
proposals mentioned above in Parts III.A and III.B. 270 If statutory
damages for willful infringement were limited to compensation for
dignitary harm they would be imposed far less frequently and in
smaller quantities by courts. Therefore, they would not pose the same
threat to the innocent recipient of a settlement demand. Furthermore,
if the loser of the copyright case were responsible for the winner's
legal costs, the author would have an incentive to only send
settlement demands to those who have likely infringed the work. If
the author sends settlement demands to people who have probably not
infringed the work, then he risks paying the defendant's court fees.
He is therefore deterred from starting cases without proper evidence
of infringement.
IV. CONCLUSION
That copyright functions to overcome a market failure is
undoubtedly accurate. In the common law world, an important goal of
copyright law is to incentivize the creation of an optimal number of
works. However, it is simply a mistake to believe this is the only
function of copyright.
The forward-looking goal of welfare
maximization may lead to socially desirable outcomes, but it fails to
provide a meaningful explanation of the relationship between the
author and the infringer. Instead, this bedrock feature of the law is
the result of copyright infringement's second function: the correction
of past injustices. The author has a right to copy the work. When the
infringer disregards that right, he creates an inequality. The infringer
bypasses the market, causing the author to lose revenue while the
infringer copies the work without paying a license fee. The law tries
to eradicate the wrongful losses and wrongful gains, and to restore the
parties to their original positions. This process upholds the author's
status as a legitimate rights holder whose rights deserve the
infringer's respect.
Sadly, lawmakers and scholars often forget about corrective
justice. Because copyright is understood in wholly instrumental
terms, the noneconomic function of copyright litigation sometimes
goes forgotten. This is seen in the three cases discussed in Part III:
270.

See supra Parts III.A-B.
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statutory damages for willful infringement, litigation fees, and mass
copyright lawsuit filings. Ultimately, society may be happy to accept
these instances of unfairness if it leads to greater economic prosperity.
However, to the extent that they run counter to the corrective justice
function of copyright, they ought to be reformed along the lines
suggested.

